Abstract This study examines changes in union contracts and wage structure during and after the introduction of regulatory reforms (deregulation and privatisation) in the Portuguese banking sector. The main finding is that, despite a relative wage erosion detected in the contract data, banking workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium in the period 1985-2000, probably reflecting the increasing profitability of the industry and the rise in labour productivity. The evidence also shows that some specific groups benefited relatively more than others: the least skilled and educated workforce and male workers gained more from the regulatory reforms. However, this unequal sharing of the wage premium did not raise wage inequality across ownership groups in the industry.
Introduction
Regulatory reform of product markets is perhaps one of the most prominent policies being undertaken in the European Union. Boosted by the establishment of the single European market, numerous regulatory changes, which aim to liberalise the provision of goods and services and enhance product market competition, have been implemented over the last two decades. Yet the empirical assessment of the impact of product market reform, relating to either imposition or relaxation of constraints, on European labour market outcomes has so far received little scrutiny. 1 In contrast, the assessment of similar policies in the US has a long tradition. Seminal work on regulation effects date from the mid 1970s, whereas the advent of deregulation policies taking place primarily in the 1980s brought a new flurry of studies covering most of the targeted industries and addressing different labour market issues. 2 All these studies evaluate how (de)regulation policies affected distortions in the respective labour markets. More specifically, most of the attention has been devoted to appraisals of labour earning responses to regulatory reforms. If there is rent-sharing between firms and unionised workers, labour earnings are likely to be higher in regulated industries (regulated periods), where the degree of competition is lower. Thus, if rents allow high wages in regulated industries (periods), then deregulation might be expected to narrow wage differentials. Nevertheless, different regulatory experiences can lead to different labour earning effects (Hendricks 1994) . For instance, Black and Strahan (2001) , find that in the US banking industry, male wages fell by 12.5% after the removal of restrictions on branching and interstate banking, while Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) find that in the US air transportation industry, trade unions were able to sustain a sizable wage premium, even twenty years after the introduction of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978.
This paper contributes to the hitherto scarce literature on European regulatory reform by analysing the effects of the deregulatory reforms in the Portuguese banking sector. In line with the US literature, it also seeks to determine the effects of such reforms on the wage structure. More precisely, this study, close to Hirsch and Macpherson's (2000) work, examines how banking compensation evolved over the transition between regulated and unregulated periods and whether reforms affected certain kind of workers differently.
The experience in the Portuguese banking industry, also labelled "valuable for other countries" since "the main reform objectives were met" without "the concomitant 1 One notable exception is Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) who examine the effects of enacting entry barriers in the French retail industry. Guadalupe (2005) looks at the effects of increased competition in the UK on wage inequality and return to skills. 2 Ehrenberg (1979) , Hendricks (1977) and Pergamit (1985) provide initial evidence on the regulation effects in several regulated sectors (transportation, communications and public utilities) while Ansar et al. (1997) and Hirsch and Schumacher (1998) focus on the electricity and health care sectors, respectively. The effects of deregulation on labour outcomes have been extensively examined in different industries, encompassing airlines (Card 1986; Cremieux 1996; Hirsch and Macpherson 2000) , trucking (Belman and Beltzer 1995; Monaco and Brooks 2001; Peoples 1996 Peoples , 1998 Rose 1987; Talley 2001) , railroad (Davis and Wilson 1999; MacDonald and Cavalluzzo 1996) , electricity (McDermott 1999; Nwaeze 2000) , cable television (Crofton et al. 2000) and banking (Black and Strahan 2001) . For analyses of multiple sectors, see Hendricks (1994) or Peoples (1998 Peoples ( , 2003 . financial instability experienced by many OECD countries" (OECD 1999, p. 64) , provides an important opportunity to analyse the effects of deregulatory reforms.
First, apart from its remarkable success, the Portuguese banking experience may be considered somewhat more complex and challenging than any experience formerly examined. In fact, in contrast with US cases, deregulatory reforms targeted a completely public (and not private) regulated sector. Therefore, there is an additional source of rent appropriation and the reforms' diversity is more extensive, comprising not only the common abolishment of both price and entry barriers but also a privatisation program.
The present study also benefits from using richer data. The prototypical American research on regulatory reforms examines individual level data from the Current Population Survey. The Portuguese individual database, Quadros de Pessoal, simultaneously accounts for both sides of the labour market, thereby enabling us to control for firm-level characteristics. This helps overcoming some drawbacks of earlier empirical research. Finally, the variety of variables available in the dataset also allows us to shed further light on rent-sharing. In particular, information about firms' ownership helps to understand the dynamics of rent appropriation in an industry with a changing ownership structure.
This study is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, an overview of the regulatory reform and the wage bargaining developments since the 1980s are presented. Data and empirical specifications are addressed in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the results obtained. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Regulatory reforms and trade unions
The Portuguese banking industry has successively undergone tremendous transformations during the last two decades. Prior to 1984, the industry was almost exclusively composed of a small number of public firms which were overstaffed and inefficient, reflecting an activity severely limited by state control (OECD 1999) . Like in many OECD countries, credit and interest rate ceilings and other capital controls governed daily banking operations. Furthermore, borrowing on public debt was compulsory, which created an additional source for credit misallocation. Entry barriers, either to new or already installed banks through branch expansion, also contributed to the lack of competition and development of the sector.
In 1984, the reversal of the regulated financial system started. The first three legal actions (law 11/83 of 16th August, decree-law 406/83 of 19th November and decreelaw 51/84 of 11th February) opened the financial intermediation to the private sector. At the same time, some of the deposit and borrowing interest rates were liberalised. This process involved a cautious sequencing of step-by-step measures which dismantled most of the regulatory instruments that directly affected the behaviour of firms. In 1992, the complete liberalisation process was accomplished with the lifting of the remaining capital controls and barriers to branch expansion. 3 Table 1 Banking industry size and performance, 1980-2000 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1997 1998-2000 Size and structure In the second phase, covering most of the 1990s, the full ownership of ten out of twelve public banks was transferred to the private sector. 4 This privatisation program (law 84/88 from 20th July and decree-law 11/90 from 5th April), following two Constitutional Amendments, shared the common goals of the worldwide privatisation processes: independence and improvement of public banks' performance and further enhancement of banking competition.
During the same period, conglomeration and technological innovations also reshaped the industry. The conglomeration process-involving the formation of groups (bancassurance)-took place mainly in the mid 1990s, while the consolidation process-starting in 1998 with the merger of three recently privatised banks-is still ongoing. The widespread use of new technologies, such as the automated teller machines (ATM) and the electronic fund transfer at the point of sale (EFTPS), also contributed to a reduction in time and costs associated with financial transactions. Table 1 displays some annual average figures that summarise the main changes occurring in banking, in terms of size and performance, over the period 1980-2000. As described previously, the period 1980-1984 corresponds to the regulated era, the 1985-1989 corresponds to the phase of deregulation, the period 1990-1997 to the privatisation phase, and 1998-2000 to the recent consolidation phase.
As a result of the abandonment of regulatory restrictions, competition and efficiency of banking increased significantly (OECD 1999) . The reforms led to a proliferation Table 2 Average nominal wage growth in union contract data, 1980-2000 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1997 1998-2000 of firms and branches which fueled the demand for labour, especially for skilled employees. Consequently, employment grew, but at a much slower pace, being sharply squeezed during the merger wave. Nevertheless, the average size of firms was reduced dramatically over the period under scrutiny. Labour productivity, measured by assets divided by employment, rose continuously, reflecting the use of a more educated workforce combined with the widespread use of new technology. This rise allowed a reduction in staff costs, in particular throughout the 1990s, from on average 1.4% of total assets to 0.8%. Profitability, measured by average real profits, declined during the initial period of increased competition (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . In the remaining periods, real profits increased markedly, reflecting the boom in the credit activity. How did regulatory reforms affect the wage bargaining in the industry? The developments described previously conditioned the type of industrial labour relations prevailing in banking, but did not affect the bargaining process itself. Covering three different geographical areas, the oldest trade unions in the mainland represent all employees, regardless the ownership of the bank. These trade unions and a group of banks, public and now private (domestic or foreign), meet each year to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement. This collective agreement, the most detailed and extensive in Portugal, regulates the employment conditions, the remuneration and the duration of work. It also delimits the starting wage level and the compulsory wage progressions for each of its 18 levels of the four groups defined to cover all the banking workforce.
Beyond this broad scope of the collective agreement, banking trade unions also enjoy the strongest attachment in the economy. Between the periods 1974-1978 and 1991-1995 , average union density increased from 71 to 106% (Cerdeira 1997) . 5 Despite this increased union density, banking unions did not contest the new market environment to any significant extent. The resistance was limited, not coordinated, mostly being made through internal speeches and pamphlets which were rarely reported in the national press. The total number of strikes was limited as well: five strikes occurred in 1986, 1988 and 1989 , each involving less than half of the total workforce (MSST 1986 (MSST -2001 . More importantly, the annual negotiated wage growth rate in banking has deteriorated after the opening of the sector. As Table 2 suggests, although the nominal wage growth bargained in the whole economy accompanied the disinflation policy, the wage growth negotiated in the banking sector is relatively lower from the 1990s onwards (Table 2) .
Data and modelling
This study uses individual-level data from a particularly appropriate dataset collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry for Social Security and Labour-Quadros de Pessoal. This source covers all firms employing paid labour in Portugal (including Azores and Madeira) and provides detailed information about each unit, employee or firm, observed. For instance, the survey records information on salaries, duration of work and on other characteristics of workers such as gender, occupation, education, age and tenure. For firms, the survey records information on ownership status, location, economic activity and firm size.
For our purpose, the major drawback of this data set is its unavailability for years before 1985. It would be interesting to examine wages in the periods before, during and after the regulatory reforms took place. Unfortunately, this data limitation makes the present analysis confined to the period 1985-2000, which nevertheless covers the period during and after the regulatory reforms were implemented.
This study follows different empirical strategies commonly employed in the deregulation literature. We start by computing an "adjusted hourly wage index", adopting the terminology of Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) , to measure changes in real hourly wages of banking employees without using any comparison group. This is constructed for the (total) banking industry by estimating a log hourly wage regression, pooled over the period 1985-2000. This is,
where log H wage it is the logarithm of the gross hourly wage for individual i in banking in year t. This variable is computed as the logarithm of the gross monthly wage (obtained as the sum of the monthly base wage, plus regular and irregular paid subsidies, payment indexed to tenure and overtime work) divided by normal and extra hours worked, after being converted to real terms (1998 prices), using the consumer price index (IPC). X itk includes variables (indexed by k) measuring worker and firm attributes and β k are the corresponding coefficients (X 0 equals unity and β 0 is the intercept). Our control variables include years of completed schooling, potential experience (age minus number of years of schooling minus 6) and its square, tenure and its square, gender, six occupational categories, six regional indicator variables, firm size, three ownership categories, two bargaining system indicators and firms' real sales per worker. This last variable is included in the specification as a proxy for firm profitability to account for the dramatic changes that occurred in banking, as previously documented. Y ear is a set of fourteen time dummy variables (indexed by y) for the period 1985-2000 and it is an error term. 6 The "adjusted hourly wage index" is constructed from the Y ear dummy coefficients φ y . These measure the logarithmic hourly wage differentials relative to the base year 1985. To obtain the percentage index, the coefficients are converted by 100× exp φ y − 1 + 100, with 1985 = 100. The "adjusted hourly wage index" is based on all banking workers in the period 1985-2000.
After dropping observations with incomplete demographic information we ended up with 652,593 banking workers. We then estimate two measures of the "relative hourly wage" by allowing the banking wage structure to vary by year and to be fully determined by different comparison groups. As argued by Rose (1987) , the choice of the reference group should satisfy two conditions. On the one hand, the control group should guarantee high mobility of workers from the treatment to the control group(s), and vice-versa, as the control group should represent true employment opportunities. On the other hand, the benchmark group should not be so narrowly defined that regulatory changes in the treatment group have significant spillover effects on the benchmark group. Otherwise, the measure will understate the regulatory effects. Therefore, there is a trade-off between broader reference groups which will do less well on the first criterion and better on the second, and conversely for narrower reference groups.
We select one broad comparison group made of a random sample of employees outside banking and one narrow comparison group which includes all employees from the sector "services to companies". This group involves diverse services such as accountancy, law or architecture and it is likely to capture employment alternatives for banking employees. Two annual measures of the "adjusted hourly wage differential" are computed separately for banking relative to either of the two comparison groups, after controlling for worker and firms attributes. These relative measures are estimated after combining 10 per cent of workers from banking with 10% of nonbanking, or with all employees from services for companies, for each year in the period 1985-2000 (drawn after dropping observations with incomplete demographic information). 7 The estimation samples correspond, on average, to 4,355, 111,983 and 10,159 employees per year in banking, nonbanking and services to companies, respectively, over the period under scrutiny. The following specification is then estimated two times per year t according to each comparison group:
where i is a worker index, t is year, k indexes the same worker and firm control variables in X itk , β k represents the corresponding coefficients and Bank is a single binary variable for banking employment. For each control group, the relative wage premium for banking is given in each year t by [ex p(δ t ) − 1] × 100. Finally, since the data allows us to split the analysis into two periods, during and after reforms, we also estimate the effect of reforms for each reference group, using a difference-in-differences estimator. More specifically, we regress for each reference group, the following equation on the pooled data 1985-2000:
where Dereg is a binary variable with value 1 for the period 1993-2000, which corresponds to the period where banking was fully deregulated or liberalised. The estimated coefficient (α 0 ) measures the change in hourly wages for employees in the comparison group following deregulation whereas the interaction term (α 2 ) measures the change in the banking log hourly wage differential post-reform. The other control variables are the same as in Eqs. (1) and (2). The pay-wage scale defined in the banking wage agreement is extremely compressed. For example, a top grade occupation earns at most six times as much as the lowest-grade occupation worker (level 18 versus level 1 of the agreement contract). This same ratio reaches 5 in centrally planned economies and 20 in the USA (Brainerd 2000) . Therefore, we also explore if the banking wage premium varies over the wage distribution. We estimate equation (2) using quantile regression techniques due to Konker and Basset (1978) . The quantile regression gives the θ th quantile, with θ ∈ (0, 1) of the distribution of log H wage it given X itk and Bank. Estimation is here restricted to five values of θ : 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90. The following estimation uses the 'sqreg' command in STATA 9 and bootstrapped standard errors repeated 20 times.
In all equations, the analysis includes exclusively full-time employees aged between 18 and 65. Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on labour earnings and on selected individual attributes in banking and in the two comparison groups, averaged over the periods previously defined.
Labour earning figures indicate that all employees experienced a strong (real 1998 PTE) hourly wage rise over the period considered, mainly reflecting the fast economic growth in the economy after the membership of Portugal in the EU. 8 Indeed, labour earnings rose on average 47, 41 and 36% from 1985-1989 to 1998-2000 in banking, nonbanking and companies' services sectors, respectively. Nevertheless, banking pays a substantially higher hourly wage than any of the two comparison groups, reflecting the use of a much more educated, older and more experienced workforce. For instance, the average number of schooling years in banking is in 1985-1989 (1998-2000) 9.1 (11.6) years, while in the rest of the economy it is only 5.2 (7.2) years. Workers in services to companies are more educated than the average economy but are considerably behind banking in terms of schooling level. Age and tenure numbers show that banking employees typically experience much longer careers in the same firm compared to employees outside the industry. 9 As Lazear (1995) suggests, the use of seniority-based wage scales creates self-enforcing contracts that promote incentives for workers to supply high efforts throughout their careers and remain in the job. Striking differences also emerge in terms of gender composition of the workforce. The banking sector is still a male dominated sector, although the proportion of women employed has increased markedly (10 percentage points) between the periods 1985-1989 and 1998-2000 . 
Empirical results
The "adjusted hourly wage index" and the two measures of the "hourly wage differential" are shown in Fig. 1 and Table 4 . Table 4 also includes results obtained from estimating equation (2) using pooled cross-section data and from Eq. (3). All measures display a similar trend during and after the reforms were introduced. The adjusted hourly wage index in 2000 implies an average real increase of 3.0% per year, while the relative hourly wage premium relative to nonbanking (services to companies) rose from 0.18 (0.15) log points in 1985 to 0.43 (0.46) log points in 2000, respectively. Nevertheless, both wage trends exhibit considerable fluctuation, a pattern also detected in the US railroad industry (see Peoples 1998; MacDonald and Cavalluzzo 1996) . 10 Despite this, there is a discernible positive trend: average wage differential relative to nonbanking (services to companies) grew from 0.25 (0.27) log points in the period 1985-1989 to 0.37 (0.54) and 0.40 (0.52) log points in the periods 1990-1997 and 1998-2000, respectively . This wage gain is also clearly attested by the difference-in-differences estimator. Regardless of the comparison group, banking employees enjoy a wage gain above 0.10 log points after the full deregulation of the industry. This remarkable wage gain contrasts with the wage loss of 0.06 log points experienced by US banking employees after branching deregulation.
Part of this wage gain is explained by changes in the market ownership structure, brought about by the arrival of new high paying firms, either domestic or foreign, as we will show later. However, the growth in the banking wage premium is most likely to be mirroring the financial health of the sector. As previously discussed, the reforms are associated with substantial improvements in labour productivity and profits, and, later on, with reductions in employment. Even though we do not have information on profits, we explore directly the hypothesis of rent-sharing in banking, by modelling the banking wage premium as a function of deregulation and sales per employee in Eq. (3). 11 Formally, this corresponds to expand the bracket term in Eq. (3) to
This modified version allows us to isolate the effect of profitability or rent-sharing by industry. Therefore, the coefficient α 4 measures the rent-sharing effect of the control group, whereas the sum of coefficients (α 3 + α 4 ) measures the banking rent-sharing effect. Table 5 shows the estimated results of modified equation (4) across the control groups: nonbanking and services to companies. Columns (1) and (4) report the results when the original full samples are used. The remaining columns report similar results when we impose different sample restrictions. The restrictions are imposed in terms of variability of firms' sales per worker over time, measured by the standard deviation. For example, results in columns (2) and (5) are obtained when we exclude workers whose firms exhibit the highest 5% variability in terms of sales per worker. We also show the implied wage-profit elasticity for each group and sample size. Table 5 suggests that, without imposing sample restrictions, the coefficients on sales per worker in banking appear to be positive but statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, when we restrict the sample, the coefficients tend to have the expected sign and be statistically significant. More importantly, though the magnitude of the coefficients in banking (α 3 + α 4 ) tend to be lower than in nonbanking or services to companies (α 4 ), the implied wage-profit elasticity (η) is generally greater. This means that, for a given change in sales, wages respond stronger in banking than in other industries. Thus, when seen in conjunction with Table 1 , which show a very fast growth of profits over the period considered, our results are compatible with a rent-sharing based explanation.
How can we conciliate the upward trend in the wage premium with the worsening of the bargained wage outcome over the nineties? In this sector, the bargained wage works as a wage floor and firms are free to set wages above the negotiated benchmark according to their specific conditions. In addition, the wage drift, the differential between the wage defined by the collective agreement and the actual wage paid, has increased since the early nineties (Aperta et al. 1994) and is the second highest in 1999 among 16 industries in Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal 2005) .
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the hourly wage premium may be overestimated. First, as referred in the press, banking has been under scrutiny by Inspecção Geral do Trabalho for misreporting the overtime work. 12 Thus, if workers have been working more hours than those reported, then the hourly wage premium is actually overvalued. Another shortcoming may result from the effective control of the firms size. Although, we control directly for the size of each bank (through the logarithm of employment), the actual size might be undervalued, as banking firms started creating conglomerate groups, within and outside banking. Thus, the actual firm size effect, which is associated economy-wide with high wages, is not fully controlled.
A closer look to specific groups
Having established an upward trend in the banking hourly wage after reforms, we now explore how it varies across some individual and firm attributes. For the sake of simplicity, in the remaining analysis we only use the rest of the economy as a comparison group. Figure 2 shows the hourly wage differential over five selected percentiles of the wage distribution. 13 The hourly wage premium at all percentiles of the wage distribution broadly replicates the pattern previously identified (mean wage differential) over the period under scrutiny. Furthermore, the wage premium, despite being pervasive, is an inverse and monotone function of the percentiles of the wage distribution. Indeed, less-skilled workers have been enjoying substantially higher gains while highly-skilled workers have been benefiting from much more modest gains. Moreover, this left skewed premium distribution, typical for public labour markets, appears unchanged/preserved over time, even after the substantial ownership changes which occurred in the industry. , 1985-2000 The shape of the wage premium distribution also reflects the generous wagepromotion policy implicit in the wage agreement contract. The wage agreement imposes automatic and compulsory merit promotions for a minimum contingent in each group of the lowest educational levels (between level 1 and 10), while these are optional for upward educational levels (clause 18 and 19, respectively, of the wage agreement). Table 6 explores the variation in the relative hourly wage of banking across ownership and gender during the period 1985-2000. The first three columns of Table 6 show the coefficients obtained by estimation model (2), where binary banking employment is interacted with two ownership dummies. The last two columns show the coefficients of the same model where the dummy variable is interacted with gender.
After the opening of the sector in 1984, the banking wage premium rose. As Fig. 3 shows, this rise is induced by the start-up of new firms, both domestic and foreign. To offset riskier jobs, these firms rewarded their workforce considerably better than the already installed public firms. 14 In the subsequent period, the movement in the wage premium in domestic firms reflects the privatisation program, which led to temporary reductions in wages during the first and second years after its introduction (Monteiro 2008) . Thus, the wage premium in private domestic firms declined substantially in 1991 and after 1994, as the two largest firm privatisations occurred in 1989 and 1994, and one bank was privatised in each of the years 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996 . In this same period, the increasingly competitive environment in the sector led to a substantial reduction of the wage premium in foreign firms. By the end of the period, the wage premium tends to converge across banking ownership groups in accordance with the bargaining system prevailing in the industry.
In terms of gender, regulatory reforms seem to have benefited men in particular. Average male wage premium went up from 0.25 in the period 1985-1989 to 0.43 log points in the period 1998-2000, while for women wages went up from 0.22 to 0.36 log points in the same time periods. This difference in wage gain across gender is reinforced by the difference-in-differences estimator. From Table 6 , we see that men 1985-1992 and 1993-2000 . Thus, in contrast with the deregulatory experience in the US banking industry (Black and Strahan 2001) and in the motor bus industry (Schwarz-Miller and Talley 2000) , our estimation results do not support the theoretical expectations of the Becker hypothesis: as discrimination becomes more costly to sustain in competitive markets, gender wage gap should be gradually eliminated.
Wage dispersion
We now focus on whether regulatory reforms lead to increased wage dispersion in banking. Table 7 presents averages of various measures of wage dispersion across banking ownership groups over the periods previously described. We examine inequality measures for both the unconditional and conditional log of hourly wage. The conditional log of hourly wage is defined as the residuals of Eq. (1) Both measures indicate that the pattern of wage dispersion prevailing in banking is similar to that found in the economy over the entire period. Thus, the wage dispersion is more pronounced at the upper tail of the distribution while at the bottom it is relatively more compressed. However, the level of wage dispersion is substantially lower (as expected from the wage scale defined in the collective agreement) in banking in each of the three periods considered. In particular, public firms, as opposed to privately owned firms (both domestic and foreign), present the most egalitarian pay policy.
In terms of trend, the wage dispersion of banking followed the rest of the economy. For instance, (unconditional) variances in banking wages grew from 0.11 in 1985-1989, to 0.15 in 1991-1997 and in 1998-2000 , while economy-wide variances grew at the same pace, from 0.25 to 0.31 to 0.29. Nevertheless, the wage dispersion declined remarkably in foreign banks. For instance, the average conditional gap 90-10 dropped from 0.90 in 1985-1989, to 0.84 in 1990-1997, to 0.58 in 1998-2000 , while in private (public) firms, it went from 0.73 (0.41) to 0.56 (0.49) to 0.53 (0.46) in the same periods. This indicates that the privatisation reform did not lead to increased wage inequality. Thus, contrary to our expectations and previous findings (Hirsch and Macpherson 2000; Guadalupe 2005) , the evidence shown here, either in level or in trend, does not confirm the hypothesis that regulatory reforms, in themselves, contribute to a rise in wage inequality.
Conclusion
Despite the worldwide implementation of regulatory reforms in product markets, the examination of the impacts on European labour outcomes has been relatively scarce. This study helps to narrow this particular gap in the regulation literature by addressing the effects of such reforms in the wage structure of the Portuguese banking sector. The Portuguese banking experience provides a notable case study as, unlike former US evidence, it targeted a public regulated sector. Therefore, the regulatory reforms are diversified, including not only the removal of price and entry controls, but also a privatisation program.
This study examines changes in union wage contracts and in the banking wage premium over the period of regulatory reforms, using data collected directly from banking unions and from Quadros de Pessoal in the period 1985-2000. The main finding is that, despite a relative drop in the contracted wages (serving as a wage 'floor'), regulatory reforms, either deregulation or privatisation, in general did not harm employees. Instead, despite the fluctuation, banking workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium. A notable exception are the workers from foreign firms who saw their above-average salaries declining during the period 1985-2000. The evidence also shows that some specific groups benefited relatively more than others. The least skilled and educated workforce, as well as male workers, gained more from the regulatory reforms. This finding contradicts the predictions from the standard discrimination theory of Becker (1957) . However, surprisingly, this unequal sharing of the wage premium did not contribute to the rise in banking wage inequality. In particular, neither deregulation nor privatisation raised wage inequality across banking ownership groups.
We have also showed that the upward trend in the banking wage premium is associated with an increase in sales per worker, suggesting that rent-sharing is a plausible mechanism for explaining our main findings. Nevertheless, a more direct rent-sharing test, relating wages to properly measured profits, would help us to be more conclusive about the underlying mechanisms.
